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THE UNITED STATES AS A DEVELOPING NATION: 
REVISITING THE PECULIARITIES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 
 
In the decades between 1850 and 1950, the United States (US) decisively transformed its place in 
the world economic order. In 1850, the US was primarily a supplier of slave-produced cotton to 
industrializing Europe. American economic growth thus remained embedded in established 
patterns of Atlantic commerce. One hundred years later, the same country had become the 
world’s undisputed industrial leader and hegemonic provider of capital. Emerging victorious 
from the Second World War, the US had displaced Britain as the power most prominently 
situated — even more so than its Cold War competitor — to impress its vision of a global 
political economy onto the world. If Britain’s industrial revolution in the late eighteenth century 
marked the beginning of a ‘Great Divergence’ (Pomeranz) of ‘the West’ from other regions 
around the world, American ascendance in the decades straddling the turn of the twentieth 
century marked a veritable ‘second great divergence’ (Beckert) that established the US as the 
world’s leading industrial and imperial power.1 
                                                          
1 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy 
(Princeton, 2001); Sven Beckert, ‘American Danger: United States Empire, Eurafrica, and the Territorialization of 
Industrial Capitalism, 1870–1950’, American Historical Review, cxxii (2017). 
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The very triumph of the US has obscured how peculiar this trajectory was in fact. Not 
only did the US overcome its status as a peripheral exporter of cash crops; it also managed to 
defy the global division of labour that buttressed the liberal-imperial world order of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. That era’s ‘Great Specialization’ (Findlay and 
O’Rourke), moulded by European and particularly British imperialism, divided the world into 
exporters of raw materials and primary products, on the one hand, and exporters of manufactured 
goods, on the other. Under this division of labour, the industrial core, primarily in Western 
Europe, turned ever more intensely to manufacturing, drawing for raw materials and agricultural 
produce on the resources of other countries far and wide. Countries elsewhere around the world, 
in turn, exported primary commodities in return for European finished goods.2 The trajectory of 
the US, however, ran askew of this divide. Neither core nor periphery, the country 
simultaneously exported an ever-growing stream of raw materials and agricultural produce while 
also rapidly industrializing. By the First World War, this former slave-owning, cotton-exporting 
republic had become a net exporter of manufactured goods.3 
                                                          
2 Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O’Rourke, Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second 
Millennium (Princeton, 2007), 365–428.  
3 ‘Broadly speaking, however, it is not inaccurate to view world trade in the nineteenth century in North–South 
terms, with the rich and industrialized North exporting industrial goods in return for the primary exports of the poor 
and agricultural South … The biggest caveat concerning this simple characterization was that the New World was 
both rich and increasingly industrial, but was also a major exporter of primary products’, Findlay and O’Rourke, 
Power and Plenty, 413–14. Quite a caveat. O’Rourke and Williamson’s recent contribution to the debate about 
industrialization on the periphery joins a long tradition of short-circuiting analysis of the case of the US by simply 
grouping it as a ‘core’ country, see Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson (eds.), The Spread of Modern 
Industry to the Periphery since 1871 (Oxford, 2017). 
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How was the US, unlike other peripheries, able to break out of the stark geography of 
specialization that characterized the world economy before the First World War? Revisiting 
different literatures on global economic history, American history in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, and the history of capitalism in the US, we are tempted to conclude that this 
question remains to be adequately formulated, never mind persuasively answered. In hindsight, 
America’s path seemed too necessary and familiar, inspiring a tendency to simply narrate it, 
rather than interrogate it as a highly unlikely process. Indeed, the relative lack of scholarly 
reflection on the economic foundations of America’s ascendance is itself evidence of the 
widespread acceptance of this process as largely unproblematic. The rise of Western Europe, and 
of the United Kingdom in particular, has exercised scholars for decades, and the search for its 
causes has spawned a colossal literature along with fierce (and unresolved) debates.4 Meanwhile, 
                                                          
4 See, for example, Eric Eustace Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill, 1944); W. W. Rostow, The Stages 
of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge, 1960); David S. Landes, The Unbound 
Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present 
(London, 1969); E. J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: The Making of Modern English Society, 1750 to the Present 
Day (New York, 1968); Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York, 1974); T. H. Aston 
and C. H. E. Philpin (eds.), The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-
Industrial Europe (Cambridge, 1985); Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment: 
The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England’, Journal of Economic 
History, xlix (1989); Joel Mokyr (ed.), The British Industrial Revolution: An Economic Perspective (Boulder, 1993); 
David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are so Rich and Some so Poor (New York, 1998); 
Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and Plenty; Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the 
Origins of Our Times (New York, 2010); Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The West and the Rest (London, 2011); Sven 
Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (New York, 2014); Joel Mokyr, A Culture of Growth: The Origins of 
the Modern Economy (Princeton, 2017). 
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the fact of America’s twentieth-century hegemony appears to have aroused interest only recently, 
not coincidentally as American power no longer appears unassailable.5 
To point out the historical atypicality of the American case, it bears emphasizing, is 
hardly to revive the idea of American exceptionalism. Quite the opposite. It is, rather, to tackle 
one of the fundamental tenets of exceptionalist thinking and insist that America did not in fact 
stand outside of ‘the universal tendencies of history, the “normal” fate of nations’.6 It seems to us 
more plausible to assume instead that the gravitational pull of political-economic constraints 
applied in the US, the same as everywhere else, and thus diverging outcomes must be rigorously 
accounted for. To do so requires situating the US within a comparative history of development 
not built on analytical benchmarks derived from the US experience.7 It means recognizing the 
slave economy as the point of origin for American capitalism, akin to other New World colonies. 
It means pushing back against a literature that has cast industrialization — an excruciatingly 
elusive goal throughout the global periphery — as an irresistible juggernaut in the case of the 
US, an overwhelming process that no measure of government corruption, business ineptitude, 
                                                          
5 Similarly, the first Great Divergence began to be interrogated only as British world hegemony waned and — along 
with it — British Whig history lost its persuasive force. 
6 Daniel Rodgers, ‘Exceptionalism’, in Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Wood (eds.), Imagined Histories: American 
Historians Interpret the Past, 23. See also Ian Tyrrell, ‘American Exceptionalism in an Age of International 
History’, American Historical Review, xcvi (1991), 1031. For an articulation of this from an economic history 
perspective, see Robert C. Allen, ‘American Exceptionalism as a Problem in Global History’, Journal of Economic 
History, lxxiv (2014). 
7 The field of comparative political economy is a major source of inspiration for this mode of level-headed analysis, 




economic crisis, grassroots resistance and ideological dissent seemed able to derail. Our goal is 
to provincialize American development from the perspective of historical experience elsewhere, 
to treat it as one path among many, rather than the analytical template for all.8 
The task of revisiting America’s ‘second great divergence’ seems particularly pressing 
today as the historical study of economic change is experiencing what might be called a post-
Polanyian paradigm shift. On the one hand, the successes of state-driven capitalism in East Asia, 
most recently in China, have called into question the market axioms of the ‘Washington 
Consensus’. From a broad comparative historical perspective, it seems clear that state-
orchestrated growth has been the norm, rather than the exception.9 This raises sharply the 
question of just why the United States, with its allegedly non-interventionist government 
institutions, should have been able to depart from this norm. On the other hand, there is an 
increasing awareness that so-called ‘free’ markets are historical unicorns: they do not exist. All 
economies are politically designed, institutionally governed, and socially embedded, including a 
fortiori (neo)liberal ones.10 All economic institutions are political; they result from and remain 
                                                          
8 For a related perspective, see Pamela Crossley, ‘China Normal,’ in Shirley Ye and Hans van de Ven (eds.), 
Modern Asian Studies: Special Forum Issue, ‘Global China’, lii (2018). 
9 See Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (London, 2002). 
10 This was, of course, Polanyi’s central insight in Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and 
Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston, Mass., 2001). For recent work in this vein, see Vanessa Ogle, ‘Archipelago 
Capitalism: Tax Havens, Offshore Money, and the State, 1950s–1970s’, American Historical Review, cxxii (2017); 
Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, Mass., 2018); Steven 
Kent Vogel, Marketcraft: How Governments Make Markets Work (New York, 2018); Mariana Mazzucato, The 
Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths (London, 2013); Christine Desan, Making 
Money: Coin, Currency, and the Coming of Capitalism (Oxford, 2014). In Slobodian’s words, this approach 
identifies neoliberalism as ‘one body of thought and one mode of governance among others — as a form or variety 
of regulation rather than its radical Other’, 3. Note that this perspective differs from Northian institutionalism, which 
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subject to political contest and compromise. The old zero-sum dichotomies, between markets and 
planning, between state ‘intervention’ and ‘spontaneous’ market activity, are now generally 
accepted as wanting. These insights call for renewed attention to the political architecture of 
American industrialization. How did state institutions forge, mobilize and ring-fence markets? 
How did political actors, social alignments and policy battles drive institutional change? 
With these questions in mind, we formulate conceptual starting points and delineate a 
research agenda. We prod existing literature for answers and formulate some preliminary 
hypotheses. In the following, we interrogate in order of appearance: (1) global economic 
histories, especially those that focus on questions of comparative development with an emphasis 
on trade and ‘factor endowments’ (territory, resources, population, geography and so on); (2) 
Americanist historiography since the Cold War; (3) more recent attempts, among both historians 
and social scientists, to make sense of the American state. Along the way, we identify allies in 
unexpected places, for example in the sociology of comparative political economy and the 
literature on East Asian developmental states. To anticipate our conclusions: both strengths and 
shortcomings of existing accounts arise from a set of analytical tendencies in which diverse 
schools of scholarship converge, namely an overreliance on modernization templates, at the 
expense of an incisive political analysis of institutions. Against the traditional view of the US as 
a market society, we call attention to a wide range of interventionist and entwined — but usually 
uncoordinated — policies emerging from American state institutions on different geographical 
scales. These policies, shaped on the contested terrain of politics, added up to what may properly 
                                                          
privileges certain institutions (the rule of law, secure property rights, limited government) as the ‘right’ (i.e. growth-
inducing) ones. The Northian perspective is hence implicitly normative and prescriptive, whereas we would stress 
that all institutional setups involve trade-offs, and hence are both effect and cause of political contestation. Like 
‘free’ markets, ‘ideal’ institutions are ideological expressions more than analytical tools. 
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be called an American developmental state: a state whose institutions collectively exerted 
discipline over economic actors and fuelled the reorientation of American capitalism from 
agrarian exports to domestic industrialization. 
I 
FACTOR ENDOWMENTS? 
The recent comparative literature on global development since the nineteenth century starkly 
bears out America’s unusual trajectory. It reveals that despite key patterns that had many 
analogues elsewhere around the world, the US nevertheless emerged in unique ways. On the one 
hand, the US partook in a widespread late-nineteenth-century pattern of hinterland penetration. 
During this period, the US expanded towards a ‘Great Frontier’, the Great Plains rising in 
tandem with the Canadian prairies, the Argentine pampas, the South African veldt, the Central 
Asian steppes and the Australian outback. Much like these rapidly expanding economic regions, 
the US violently conquered territory, absorbed large amounts of European capital, and attracted 
large numbers of immigrants, facilitating massive agricultural production that poured into world 
markets.11 Alongside its extensive ‘horizontal’ frontier, the US also developed a robust ‘vertical’ 
frontier. As in other peripheral regions of the world economy during the heyday of ‘imperial 
geology’, Americans excavated fossil fuels, ores and minerals at escalating speeds. The US thus 
became the site of intensive extraction of the Earth’s bounty, including copper (alongside 
Mexico, Chile, Peru and the Congo), coal (Russia, India and China), tin (Malaya, Indonesia and 
                                                          
11 Foreign investments reached 20 per cent of world GDP on the eve of the First World War, a figure that was not 
reached again until about 1980, Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and Plenty, 408. 
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Bolivia), silver (Mexico and Australia), gold (Australia and Russia), lead (Australia), zinc 
(Australia), and petroleum (Russia).12 
Both the vertical and horizontal frontiers of the US far exceeded those of other world 
regions in scale and diversity. This resource abundance was due, not simply to better natural 
endowment, but to more intensive and extensive exploration, cultivation and extraction, fostered 
by American institutions. This, of course, is part of the historical puzzle.13 But even more 
notably, nowhere outside the United States did frontier expansion trigger large-scale 
industrialization, let alone a massive economic transformation. Resource abundance elsewhere 
tended to become a curse, leading to ‘Dutch disease’ — excessive specialization on extraction or 
cultivation of primary commodities — and thus failure to industrialize.14 The economies of 
Argentina, Australia, Chile, Brazil and Russia, to name a few examples, grew very fast based on 
the export of primary commodities, but their industrial development remained comparatively 
limited.15 Home-grown industry in those countries concentrated narrowly on upstream 
                                                          
12 Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century, trans. Patrick 
Camiller (Princeton, 2014), 655–6, 658–9.  
13 A. Paul David and Gavin Wright, ‘Increasing Returns and the Genesis of American Resource Abundance’, 
Industrial and Corporate Change, vi (1997). 
14 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, ‘The Curse of Natural Resources’, European Economic Review, xlv 
(2001). We are, of course, fully aware of the normativity built into the language here: ‘failure’, ‘curse’, 
‘overspecialized’, ‘disease’ and so on. Provincializing the story of the United States would go a long way toward 
unpacking these built-in assumptions. 
15 In Russia, continuous land expansion meant that over 60 per cent of national wealth was based on agricultural 
land at the end of the nineteenth century, which was more than India at that point (53.8 per cent). In the US, despite 
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processing of foodstuffs and other raw materials, not on a broad range of manufactured goods for 
domestic, let alone foreign, consumption.16 By sharp contrast, the US exploited its frontier 
expansion and its extractive industries to develop what became, by the First World War, the 
largest manufacturing economy in the world.17 
To read accounts that grapple with the disparity between the US and other world 
peripheries is to encounter a literature rife with subtle elisions, circular arguments, shifting logics 
and contradictory claims. Scholars routinely attribute industrial development in the US to factors 
that only several pages later they invoke to explain failure to industrialize elsewhere. Crucial 
preconditions are simply assumed, not interrogated. The same building blocks that historians 
deploy to chronicle the dazzling arrival of American modernity are used, with an abrupt change 
in background music, to chart impending doom and crisis in other contexts. 
Consider, for example, how the literature contends with the issue of the size of each 
country’s domestic market. At times, a small domestic market is cited as the reason for a 
country’s failure to industrialize; on other occasions, it appears as a consequence of this failure. 
Sometimes, a large domestic market is presented as simply a felicitous geographical and 
                                                          
massive territorial expansion, the figure stood at 19.2 per cent. See Edward B. Barbier, Scarcity and Frontiers: How 
Economies Have Developed through Natural Resource Exploitation (Cambridge, 2011), 390. 
16 Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and Plenty, 411. O’Rourke and Williamson helpfully differentiate between the 
processing of primary commodities, mainly for exports, which are more characteristics of the periphery, and the 
production of ‘import- or export-competing’ goods. See O’Rourke and Williamson, Spread of Modern Industry to 
the Periphery, 2. 
17 Gavin Wright, ‘The Origins of American Industrial Success, 1879–1940’, American Economic Review, lxxx 
(1990); David and Wright, ‘Increasing Returns and the Genesis of American Resource Abundance’; Gavin Wright 
and Jesse Czelusta, ‘The Myth of the Resource Curse’, Challenge, xlvii (2004). 
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demographic fact. At other times, a large domestic market is cited as a social and political 
project. Economist Edward Barbier, for example, in what is otherwise a well-crafted synthesis, 
explains in a typical string of non sequiturs, that ‘the small size of the economy’ of New Zealand 
‘limited its diversification beyond its main agricultural industries’. Argentina, on the contrary, 
was by no means small, and yet it nevertheless had ‘very little domestic industry’, which in turn 
failed to generate effective demand for resource extraction. Finally, Australia also had a sizeable 
territory and a small domestic market but nonetheless saw the growth of extractive industries. 
These extractive sectors, however, developed ‘no linkages with any domestic industry’ and 
therefore generated ‘little effort to diversify the economy’.18 In the case of the US, by contrast, 
Barbier (and others) confidently announce the presence of the necessary ‘linkages and 
complementarities to the resource sector’ that allowed the natural bounty of North America to 
fuel US industrialization.19 A pre-existing ‘huge domestic market’, it is stated almost as a matter 
of course, supported both intensified extraction and growing manufacturing capacity, while still 
leaving plenty of room for exports.20 
The role of transatlantic shipping costs is yet another example of slippery causality in 
accounting for American industrialization. In their authoritative canvas of global trade and 
                                                          
18 Barbier, Scarcity and Frontiers, 412, 408, 410. 
19 Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and Plenty, 411. 
20 Alfred Chandler similarly identified ‘the geographical size and very rapid growth of [the American] domestic 
market’ as a key factor in US industrialization, but without actually explaining how it came about or why it grew so 
rapidly, Alfred D. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), 
51–2. Richard Bensel has usefully focused critical attention on the geographical size of the market, its boundedness 
and internal coherence as politically determined. See Richard Franklin Bensel, The Political Economy of American 
Industrialization, 1877–1900 (Cambridge, 2000). 
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development, Ronald Findlay and Kevin O’Rourke argue that the US benefitted from high 
transport costs of minerals such as iron. Instead of trading internationally, those minerals 
stimulated national industry. Unlike raw cotton, which was easily carried across the Atlantic, the 
high cost of shipping heavy minerals ‘crowded in’ manufacturing domestically, rather than 
‘crowding it out’. This, they readily concede, ‘does not apply to Latin America … whose 
exports’ — despite equally high transatlantic shipping costs, we assume — ‘mainly consisted of 
primary products’, including of course many important industrial minerals. Barbier follows a 
similar line of argument when he celebrates the US’s ability to flourish due to its ‘economic 
distance’ from the rest of the world. The American economy’s virtual ‘isolation’ — the death 
knell of development everywhere else — in fact allowed it to nurture internal commerce and 
industrial expansion. In the case of Latin American countries, however, Barbier makes clear that 
‘prohibitive’ shipping costs did not crowd in much of anything, but instead stifled the incentive 
for exploration. Likewise, in places such as South Africa and Australia, ‘formidable 
transportation costs’ and distance ‘from the main international trade routes’ to major European 
markets operated, not as a spur to domestic industrialization, but as an impediment to more 
intensive mineral extraction.21 
The fact that analysis of ‘factor endowments’ generates more questions than answers can 
be illustrated another way, by considering a salient country-to-country comparison. The case of 
Argentina’s ‘Belle Époque’ from 1875 to 1913 is very telling, especially since it in many ways 
mirrored the experience of the US (as scholars of Latin America are much more aware than those 
of the US). In those years, a newly consolidated Argentinian state, having overcome a series of 
                                                          
21 Barbier, Scarcity and Frontiers, 427–8, 409. 
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constitutional crises, asserted itself in its borderlands. Launching its infamous Campaña del 
Desierto or ‘Expedition to the Desert’, it violently decimated and removed the native population, 
more firmly establishing national sovereignty on the far peripheries of its territory. Easy access 
to ever-growing reserves of fertile land — from 400 to 858 thousand square kilometres between 
1867 and 1890 alone — supported the growth of a vibrant agro-pastoral export economy in the 
interiors of the Southern Cone. Huge infusions of outside capital financed the massive expansion 
of the railroad system, facilitating the influx of a large settler population. Grain agriculture — 
wheat, corn and linseed — took off, alongside cow and sheep raising. In consequence, the region 
forcefully transcended its early origins as a satellite of the extractive economy of the Central 
Andes, which had earlier been the region’s main source of wealth.22  
Argentina became a leading example of liberal economic policy during this period. It was 
firmly committed to secure property rights (for settlers), global commerce, open immigration, a 
non-interventionist government, and the gold standard. The country’s elite, made up of 
merchants and export producers, grew confident and embraced a forward-looking spirit of 
improvement. They aggressively promoted scientific agriculture, breeding sheep and cattle to 
maximize meat production and to better meet consumer demand. As a result, the Argentinian 
                                                          
22 Argentina was the wealthiest country in Latin America at the time and yet ‘a major disappointment’ in terms of 
industrialization, with levels of manufacturing per head below that of European countries with lower income per 
person, see Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America since Independence, 3rd edn. 
(Cambridge, 2014), 154. More on Argentina, see Gerardo Della Paolera and Alan M. Taylor (eds.), A New 
Economic History of Argentina (Cambridge, 2003), 235–7; Colin M. Lewis, British Railways in Argentina, 1857–
1914: A Case Study of Foreign Investment (London, 1983); Eduardo Elena, ‘Commodities and Consumption in 
“Golden Age” Argentina’, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History (New York, 2016). On the 
shared commitment to frontier settlement and railroad expansion in the US and Argentina, as well the similar 
collision with indigenous resistance, see Charles S. Maier, Once Within Borders: Territories of Power, Wealth, and 
Belonging since 1500 (Cambridge, Mass., 2016), 139–45, 204, 207.  
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economy generated remarkable rates of growth. As the gateway to the bountiful pampas 
grasslands, the city of Buenos Aires grew by leaps and bounds, from a small provincial town to a 
metropolis of over 1.5 million people by the First World War, the largest city in Latin American 
and second only to New York on the Atlantic seaboard. The Argentinian capital’s docks, rail 
yards and warehouses connected the commodity flows from the rapidly expanding hinterland to 
consumers in urban-industrial markets in Europe. A local manufacturing sector emerged based 
on food processing for export. All told, between 1880 and 1914, Argentina’s gross domestic 
product per capita increased at an annual average of 3.3 per cent, a pace that surpassed that of 
Great Britain (1 per cent), Canada (2.2 per cent) and even that of the United States (2.1 per 
cent).23  
What is striking about this profile from the perspective of US historiography is its close 
similarity to oft-invoked ‘explanations’ of American industrialization during the same period: an 
expanding frontier, the ethnic cleansing of indigenous people, the massive expansion of a 
railroad network into the interior of the continent, the rapid influx of European settlers, the 
growth of a commercial agricultural landscape that yielded staggering volumes of market 
commodities, heavy investment in scientific agriculture and other technologies, and, finally, the 
rise of urban centres oriented around the gathering, processing and distribution of this natural 
bounty. William Cronon’s canonical Nature’s Metropolis, to take an obvious example, attributes 
Chicago’s rapid growth precisely to its position as a gateway hub to the incessant flow of 
                                                          
23 There is some disagreement about the precise numbers but not on the overall trend. Roberto Cortés Conde, ‘The 
Vicissitudes of an Exporting Economy: Argentina, 1875–1930,’ in Victor Bulmer-Thomas, John H. Coatsworth and 
Roberto Cortés Conde (eds.), An Economic History of Twentieth-Century Latin America (Oxford, 2000), i, 267. 
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primary commodities, including wheat, meat and lumber.24 Cronon’s melancholy about this 
economic expansion notwithstanding (more about this soon), his account leans heavily on these 
factors to account for developmental ‘success’. In the case of Argentina, by contrast, the 
scholarship interprets the same processes as a very mixed economic blessing, if not as a 
harbinger of a century of crises and decline.  
In marked contrast to the literature about the American West, the Argentinian scholarship 
on Buenos Aires and the pampas has viewed growth that remained export-focused and 
‘predominantly agriculturally based’, not as a sign of relentless capitalist development, but as 
cause for grave worry.25 The Argentinian capital’s emphasis on meatpacking, flour milling and 
wool-washing, alongside other resource-based goods such as leather, wood products and glass, 
created only a narrow foundation for manufacturers. At least since the 1930s, several generations 
of scholarship on Argentina have grappled with ‘what went wrong’ — a problematic framing, of 
course. They have interrogated the severe structural ‘malaise’ caused by export-led growth, 
which set the country on a course towards endemic balance-of-payments difficulties, public debt 
crises, and political and social instability.26 In other words, what Cronon and other Americanists 
                                                          
24 William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York, 1991). 
25 Barbier, Scarcity and Frontiers, 406. For a good overview of these debates in the context of Latin America, with a 
focus on Argentina, see Matthew Brown (ed.), Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce and Capital 
(Malden, Mass., 2008). See also, most recently, a special issue on ‘Argentine Exceptionalism’ in the Latin American 
Economic Review (2018). See Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael Di Tella and Lucas Llach, ‘Introduction to Argentine 
Exceptionalism’, Latin American Economic Review, xxvii (2018); Filipe Campante and Edward L. Glaeser, ‘Yet 
Another Tale of Two Cities: Buenos Aires and Chicago’, Latin American Economic Review, xxvii (2018).  
26 As of 1900, manufacturing output was only 15 per cent of GDP and remained closely linked to export sectors. 
Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco were 56.5 per cent of Argentinian manufacturing. Other resource-based products 
— leather, wood products, stone, glass and ceramics — were 18.8 per cent, see Lloyd George Reynolds, Economic 
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could take for granted as a sure path to an economic miracle, was often — in the absence of 
other, unaccounted for factors or forces — the road towards dependency and crisis.27 Most 
recently, in his magisterial recent exploration of the global 1800s, Jürgen Osterhammel concedes 
the issue: ‘Why did the countries of Latin America not succeed in linking up with the industrial 
dynamic … before the experiments with state-sponsored import substitution in the period 
between the two world wars? This remains an unanswered question’.28 If that is indeed the case, 
we must similarly acknowledge that the reason why the US did succeed remains equally unclear. 
 
II 
THE THREE WEBERIAN MODES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 
                                                          
Growth in the Third World, 1850–1980 (New Haven, 1985), 88. For revisionist studies of Argentinian 
industrialization but those that can only partially soften earlier findings, see Fernando Rocchi, Chimneys in the 
Desert: Industrialization in Argentina during the Export Boom Years, 1870–1930 (Stanford, Calif., 2006); Yovanna 
Pineda, Industrial Development in a Frontier Economy: The Industrialization of Argentina, 1890–1930 (Stanford, 
Calif., 2009). 
27 Campante and Glaeser’s recent study confirms our own sense that Chicago and Buenos Aires were similar types 
of cities in the nineteenth century, primarily as railway hubs to continental hinterlands and conduits for the massive 
flow of grain and meat. Chicago was distinguished, economically, by its ability to nurture a broad industrial base 
and become an industrial city, not only a centre of commerce and food processing. Their analysis emphasizes in 
particular Chicago’s large employment in an advanced sector of foundry and machine shop products, catering to a 
population of relatively affluent Midwestern farmers, which set Chicago apart from Buenos Aires (but gets little 
attention in Cronon’s account). See Campante and Glaeser, ‘Yet Another Tale of Two Cities’. Cronon’s analysis of 
Chicago, we conclude, is a much better fit for Buenos Aires. For more on the diverse manufacturing base of 
Chicago, see Robert D. Lewis, Chicago Made: Factory Networks in the Industrial Metropolis (Chicago, 2008). 
28 Osterhammel, Transformation of the World, 660. For another marvelous account, see Steven C. Topik and Allen 
Wells, Global Markets Transformed: 1870–1945 (Cambridge, Mass., 2014). Topik and Wells are attentive to 
continued heterogeneity within the interconnected world economy but do not shed light on the American case. 
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Histories of the US during the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era have long addressed 
America’s rise from the perspective of national historical parameters, without explicitly asking 
global comparative questions. Scholars such as Alfred Chandler, Louis Galambos and Robert 
Wiebe — a group one might call American Whig historians — deployed an array of -izations 
(industrialization, urbanization, professionalization) to narrate the rise of a more efficient, more 
rational, and more modern American capitalism.29 Their accounts portrayed the period between 
the Civil War and the Great Depression as a social, political and economic transformation both 
vast and progressive. Competitive markets of small proprietors yielded to managerial capitalism, 
mass-production industries obliterated obsolete craft distinctions, local economies integrated into 
a national market, a capacious federal administration superseded an archaic state of ‘courts and 
parties’, Progressivism and the New Deal eclipsed Populism. These scholars perceived the 
process, not only as generally welcome, but even more significantly, as essentially without 
alternative. To the extent that this literature had a comparative bent, it assumed American 
exceptionalism. To the extent that it deployed a theory of development, that theory was 
modernization. Stripped of its historical contingency and identified with historical progress itself, 
American development could be identified with modernization as such. The result was a deep 
tautology: America most successfully modernized, as it were, because it became most 
successfully modern. 
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Of course, the more or less muted triumphalism of the American Whigs was never 
universally shared. Sceptics of different stripes have developed competing theoretical and 
narrative modes, of which two are most conspicuous. The first alternative mode may be called a 
melancholy one. Rather than celebrating America’s modernization, these histories have stressed 
its deleterious effects. The process disempowered workers and assured the triumph of capital.30 It 
commodified and devastated the environment.31 It foreclosed more democratic political 
alternatives.32 A second alternative mode has challenged the Whig assumption of increasing 
efficiency and rationalization. This mode finds little that was rational in America’s 
transformation, and certainly no movement towards order. It instead emphasizes skullduggery, 
waste, manipulation and corruption.33 
These three explanatory modes — we might call them the Whig, the melancholy, and the 
normative — certainly do not exhaust the historiography, but they represent patterns that pervade 
it. What explanatory power do each of these modes have for the question of American 
development? The sceptics have charged — correctly, in our view — that the Whigs have 
                                                          
30 David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activism, 
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uncritically channelled a Weberian equation of capitalist modernity with rationalization, and thus 
delivered an unconvincingly sanguine and overdetermined account of America’s late-nineteenth-
century transformations. But the sceptics protest too much. Melancholy and normative modes are 
not so much alternatives to the Whig narrative as their photonegatives. Despite the differences in 
temperament, they nonetheless reproduce the contours of the very modernization narrative they 
set out to critique. 
The melancholy mode reverses the value judgements of the Whig narrative but 
essentially leaves its contours unaffected. For example, few readers would confuse the profound 
sense of regret that permeates Cronon’s history of Chicago — his lament over the loss of 
individual autonomy, the degradation of the environment, and eradication of indigenous cultures 
— with the triumphalism of Chandler’s account. Yet in his economic interpretation, Cronon fully 
follows Chandler’s lead. Similar to Chandler’s Weberian managers, Cronon’s capitalists 
‘worship[ped] at the altar of efficiency’ and made ‘war on waste’ as they administered the 
ceaseless flow of livestock, lumber and grain. Like Chandler, Cronon emphasizes the decisive 
role of technology, especially the railroad and the telegraph (alongside more prosaic inventions 
such as grain elevators, refrigerated cars, barbed wires and McCormick reapers). Cronon readily 
concedes that ‘no historian has shed brighter light’ on the economic forces behind this process 
than Chandler himself.34 Dismissing political opposition to corporate power in the late nineteenth 
century as misguided, he casts corporate consolidation, in Chandlerian terms, as deeply 
                                                          
34 Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis, 410, see also 442, 458. 
19 
 
‘structural’ — driven by a deep-seated ‘logic of capital’ — and thus beyond the reach of social 
contestation and political influence.35 
If melancholy accounts share with the Whigs a sense of inevitability, the third, normative, 
mode narrates events against the implicit counterfactual of a preferable alternative. It thus 
introduces modernization through the back door. Here, America’s history is seen to have fallen 
short of certain — often not fully articulated — benchmarks. A more orderly, equitable and 
benign development might have happened if America’s capitalists had not been so reckless, if the 
American state was more capacious, bureaucratic and immune to corruption, if workers and 
farmers had not been enthralled by pervasive market mythologies. In his Railroaded, for 
example, Richard White has recently sought to distance himself from Wiebe and Chandler, 
whom he identifies as ‘children of Max Weber’ and to whose equation of modernity ‘with order 
imposed by impersonal large-scale organizations’ he objects.36 The canvas that Railroaded paints 
of capitalist modernity, however, is not so much different but, in fact, a mirror image of the one 
delivered by the Whigs: instead of rational, efficient and productive, it is volatile, chaotic and 
wasteful. Far from sober and impartial mandarins, his capitalists are corrupt, inept and greedy. 
The state is populated not by diligent bureaucrats but by profiteering politicians. Functionality is 
thus replaced with dysfunction, salaried employees with ego-driven buccaneers, order with 
disorder, and fulfilment with failure. This normative historiography implicitly preserves the 
Chandlerian paradigm as a necessary point of reference. The conclusion to Railroaded 
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demonstrates this as it contemplates an alternate history of capitalism: an American West where 
railroads were built ‘more cheaply, more efficiently, and with fewer social and political costs’, 
an economic transition with ‘fewer rushes and collapses, fewer booms and busts’. This 
counterfactual history is one where economic change proceeded at a slower and more deliberate 
pace, a history ‘where railroads were built as demand required’.37 Any alternative paths outside 
of Chandlerian coordinates remain unfathomable, including the possibility that the US might 
have followed a more typical route for New World economies. 
How deeply all three modes identified here ultimately fall back on notions of 
modernization may be gauged by the fact that all three are already deployed in Max Weber’s 
master narrative of Western capitalism. As readers will recall, the culmination point of this 
master narrative was the ‘modern, large-scale enterprise’ based on wage labour, modern 
technology, future-oriented calculation and capital accounting, professional specialization and so 
on.38 As a thoroughly rationalized, bureaucratic organization, the modern enterprise was superior 
to all previous forms of businesses.39 It was this depiction of the modern firm that Alfred 
Chandler took up enthusiastically and made into the theoretical anchor for understanding the 
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development of the American corporation. Indeed, in the passages about bureaucracy from 
Economy and Society, Weber comes closest to sounding like the herald of business 
modernization that Chandler took him to be.40 The sceptics are certainly correct in connecting 
Chandler’s Whig history to Weberian inspirations.  
But Weber also deployed melancholy, especially when he moved from the level of 
organization to the social level. Describing the structural coercion that capitalism exerted over 
individuals, Weber tended to indulge a certain fateful inflection that Chandler blissfully ignored. 
To Weber, the rationalization of life implied a distinct loss. As he explained in The Protestant 
Ethic, capitalism was ‘an immense cosmos into which the individual is born; it is presented to 
him, at least as an individual, as a housing that in practice cannot be modified, and in which he 
must live’.41 It engendered an ‘infinitely burdensome, deeply serious regimentation of the whole 
conduct of life’.42 The flip side of this lament, however, was that capitalism took on an 
inexorable quality. Like the cosmos itself, capitalism was overpowering, beyond political 
agency. Seen in this light, Weber’s ‘iron cage’ implied not so much a critique of capitalist 
transformations but the assertion that there was no alternative to acceding to its logic. 
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Finally, Weber entertained a deeply normative distinction between two types of capitalist 
behaviour: one sober, steady, shrewd, the other illicit, rapacious and irrationally acquisitive. 
Weber saw a world of difference between ‘the calculation of profitability that is characteristic of 
the bourgeois rational conduct of business’ and ‘the kind of capitalism which lives from some 
momentary, purely political conjuncture — from government contracts, financing wars, black-
market profiteering, from all the opportunities for profit and robbery, the gains and risks 
involved in adventurism’. These ‘two different types of capitalism’ were ‘as mutually opposed as 
it is possible for two mental and moral forces to be’.43 As examples of the latter type, Weber 
wheeled in the usual suspects of American capitalism: Henry Villard’s attempt to corner the 
shares of the Northern Pacific Railroad in 1889 exemplified modern-day ‘grandiose robber 
capitalism (Beutekapitalismus)’.44 Other examples were J.P. Morgan, Jay Gould and Rockefeller 
— ‘economic Übermenschen’ who stood ‘beyond good and evil’.45 Weber repeated that ‘the 
structure and spirit of this robber capitalism differed radically from the rational management of 
an ordinary capitalist large-scale enterprise’. It was, instead ‘most similar to some age-old 
phenomena: the huge rapacious enterprises in the financial and colonial sphere, and occasional 
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trade with its mixture of piracy and slave hunting’.46 Drawing on the American scene (as he did 
in a variety of ways), Weber helped forge the dichotomy between the villainous ‘robber baron’ 
and the noble ‘industrial statesman’ that later became the defining typology of American 
business history.47 
Weber reveals that for full effectiveness the modernization narrative requires not only the 
triumphalist mood but also its supporting acts, the melancholy and the normative. With some 
selective reading, one can — as Chandler did — deploy Weber for a triumphalist narrative of 
modernization. Pushing back against triumphalism by emphasizing loss and structural coercion 
— as Cronon did — echoes Weber’s ‘melancholy’ mode. But by the same token, doing so runs 
the risk of inviting, if unwittingly, TINA (There-is-no-alternative) politics by capitulating to 
capitalism’s putative historical and political ineluctability. Finally, lobbing normative volleys 
against capitalist adventurism does not in itself destabilize the background framework of 
overdetermined historical change. On the contrary, this type of muckraking only reaffirms, if 
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unwittingly, a dubious distinction between legitimate and benign capitalist behaviour and its 
illicit counterparts. 
But for our purposes — the question of US development in comparative perspective — 
the main problem lies deeper. Indulging in Weberian narrative modes means, at least to a degree, 
remaining hostage to specific political assumptions about capitalism. To spell out some of these: 
on the one hand, Weber ascribes capitalism’s rise to a well-defined set of actors: the heroic, 
rational bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the capitalism that this class created results in a type of 
structural coercion (the ‘iron cage’) from which there is no escape and to which there is no 
alternative: the denial of actors. Thus capitalism is at once a historical creation and beyond 
political design; it is at once malleable and closed. In the hands of the enterprising bourgeoisie, 
capitalism is a creative historical project. Confronted with suggestions that capitalism’s contours 
are susceptible to alternative political designs, however, it becomes an unalterable system that 
requires complete conformity. It is worth appreciating what this gesture does: modern capitalism 
is at once proudly established as the project of a heroic set of actors, to whom the 
accomplishments belong; at the same time, this class project is universalized as without 
alternative. Contingency, conflict, and political contestation surrender to pre-determined 
outcomes. Questions of power melt into stale debates about character, efficiency and ethics. 
Unable to escape the heavy hand of Chandler’s legacy, these frameworks offer limited purchase 
for questions of comparative development. 
 
III 
TOWARD A POLITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 
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At one point, modernization theory provided ready-made typologies that analysed comparative 
development in terms of class formation and class alliances. A lot of ink was spilled on the long-
term impact of various social alignments, using these assessments to make confident 
explanations for diverging national trajectories. Wherever landed elites retained their power, 
scholarship in this vein proposed, these classes ‘impeded’ successful modernization, that is, the 
‘arrival’ of a central national authority, liberal labour markets, land redistribution, and 
democratic politics. They thereby either locked-in their country’s pattern of ‘underdevelopment’ 
or, alternatively, set it upon the dreaded top-down ‘Prussian path’. By contrast, wherever the 
industrial bourgeoisie gained dominance, their countries progressed along their merry way 
towards liberal capitalism, ensuring the spread of market relations, secure property rights, 
codified laws, and a vibrant civil society. Studies closely scrutinized the similarities and 
differences between American cotton planters, Brazilian sugar lords, Prussian Junkers, and 
Russian nobles, as well as the impact of taken-for-granted historical ‘pivots’ such as the Civil 
War in the US, the Crimean War in Russia, the Napoleonic Wars and Revolution of 1848 in 
Prussia, and the Paraguayan War in Brazil.48 
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This mode of explanation has suffered several crippling blows, including a discerning 
dissection from David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley (which has this essay’s subtitle). Blackbourn 
and Eley’s canonical intervention not only critiqued the idea of the German Sonderweg, but, 
more broadly, rejected schematic notions of bourgeois revolution and the liberal normativity 
these notions reified. They raised questions about the liberal commitments of all bourgeois 
classes and the unquestioned equation of Western European liberal democracy as a stand-in for 
successful modernization as such. What is the point of ascribing historical roles to highly 
essentialized social classes, they asked, then calling them out for falling short of fulfilling these 
roles? Upon closer scrutiny, the entire framework appeared to be based on evolutionary 
teleologies, normative assumptions and arbitrary juxtapositions.49 
In regard to the antebellum period, US historiography has fully followed Eley and 
Blackbourn’s theoretical lead. Over the last two decades, the organizing assumptions of post-war 
historiography unravelled one by one. Southern planters, long held to be defenders of a 
‘seigneurial’ pre-capitalist regime, have been recast as dynamic, forward looking, and 
aggressively capitalist, like the unfree labour system over which they presided. The same could 
be said about mercantile elites, who had been assumed to be at odds with the rising industrial 
order. Industrial capitalists, in turn, have been revealed to be much more politically conservative, 
less democratic, and friendly to the expansion of slavery and to coercive labour regimes more 
generally. As the literature became less comparative and more globalist, scholars began to 
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emphasize long-distance connections that made regional patterns intimately linked and 
interrelated, not separate and distinct.50 The clearly demarcated building blocks that formed the 
basis of classic modernization histories — the geographical units, the divide between state and 
market, free and unfree labour, the class typology — now seem too muddled to be of any use. 
This revisionist wave of scholarship about American slavery and capitalism has offered 
powerful and persuasive insights. It has established the centrality of the cotton-slavery complex, 
not only to the economy of the US in the early decades of the nineteenth century, but to the rise 
of American commerce, financial institutions, business practices, and political and legal 
institutions. It has challenged the Civil War as a self-evident watershed in the transition to 
‘modern’ capitalism. In the process, however, this scholarship has also undermined the grand 
explanatory framework historians had long relied on. This work has torn down an entrenched 
theoretical foundation — no small accomplishment — but to date no alternative framework has 
taken its place, leaving us with some key historical questions in search of new answers. In the 
absence of antagonistic regional elites, for example, how are we to make sense of antislavery or 
the root causes of the Civil War? How was a confident, profitable, and relentless slave empire 
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defeated, by whom, and why? Did the war indeed mark the triumph of industrial capitalism over 
a political and ideological rival? Was it a contingent historical blunder or perhaps a non-event, 
one massive meaningless bloodshed? Given the new scholarly emphasis on the limits of 
emancipation and on the easy reconciliation between sectional elites, could the war still account 
for why the US emerged along a different path than the other New World republics? 
Into this impasse enters the other significant revisionist effort in US historiography, 
namely the reinvigorated scholarship about the American state. Long viewed as slow, weak or 
deficient, the new consensus is that the American state has always been ‘more powerful, 
capacious, tenacious, interventionist, and redistributive than was recognized in earlier accounts’, 
to use William Novak’s bold formulation.51 This sharp reversal, while insightful, is not without 
its perils. The temptation to lean heavily on ‘the state’ as a deus ex machina that solves all 
riddles in a broad set of historical topics, from racialized suburbanization to global economic 
hegemony, is great, as is the tendency to overstate the state’s coherence, capacity and 
accomplishments.52 Nevertheless, this scholarship regains explanatory traction that has been lost 
elsewhere. If the late-nineteenth-century US indeed departed from the prevailing global patterns, 
this must in some way be attributed to the particular features of American state institutions. 
We identify three important currents in the contemporary historical literature about the 
American state: the territorial, institutionalist, and pragmatic. Each current yields significant 
insights, but each also remains in some ways incomplete, especially for our own comparative 
purposes. The first, the territorial, associated with Charles Maier, emphasizes the state’s spatial 
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aspects, particularly its ability to enclose land, establish and protect clear borders, and 
bureaucratically administer its domain. Maier discusses the US alongside other states, identifying 
in the US an equivalent ‘Leviathan 2.0’ to those that were in play elsewhere, similarly equipped 
to ‘permeate and master territory’.53 Steven Hahn has followed suit, likewise placing the rise of 
the central territorial state in the late nineteenth century at the core of his own recent synthesis. 
Hahn emphasizes the federal government’s ability to contain challenges against central state 
authority on several fronts (Southern secessionists, Native Americans, Mormons, privately 
funded filibusterers), and its capacity to ‘extend its arms’ across the Trans-Mississippi West.54 
Sven Beckert is most explicit about the direct economic implications of American state capacity, 
particularly the drive to ‘capture a huge continent by force and then, critically, to integrate that 
territory administratively into its state structures’.55 
Maier’s framework undoubtedly illuminates key features of state formation in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This framework, however, is geared to explore 
commonalities and generalize across cases, not make sense of variations and anomalies. 
Moreover, as is also the case for Hahn and Beckert, this approach seems more concerned with 
the outer bounds of sovereignty — the integration of frontiers and peripheries — than with how 
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national space in turn became economically productive. They imply that the very act of 
enclosing territory allowed it, as Maier puts it, to ‘crackle with productive potential’.56 However, 
territorialization and the administration of space via the railroad and the telegraph was not unique 
to the US While these accomplishments fuelled economic growth, they — as shown previously 
— did not normally result in national industrialization. The use of tariff protections — an 
important aspect of the postbellum political economy — was also not unique to the US. Latin 
American countries deployed similar policies with very different results.57 To fully understand 
the unique path of the US, it seems, the analysis of territoriality is necessary but not sufficient. It 
must be combined with greater attention to domestic legal architectures and political 
arrangements — the political tendons, muscles and sinews that pervaded national space. 
The relative neglect of interior arenas in the literature on territoriality has been most 
recently taken up by institutionalist economists Naomi Lamoreaux and John Wallis. Aiming to 
interrogate the domestic intricacies of the American political economy, the two have directed 
their attention away from the national government and towards the states.58 ‘Most of the 
important development that propelled … economic modernization in the nineteenth century’, 
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they argue, ‘occurred at the state level’.59 They emphasize in particular the Jacksonian-era 
eradication of special legal privileges in favour of new impersonal rules in the areas of 
infrastructure, banking, and incorporation. Building on the work of Douglass North, they 
theorize this shift as a transition from a ‘limited access’ to an ‘open access’ system. They 
propose that the new ‘open access’ society ‘eliminated the discretionary authority of state 
legislatures’, a presumed source of ‘systemic corruption’, and replaced it with impersonal 
processes that nurtured the creation of a ‘vibrant competitive economy’.60 Their analysis points 
to this competitive market environment, fortified by state institutions, to explain rapid American 
economic development. 
The distinctive characteristics of the American state that Lamoreaux and Wallis identify, 
particularly their emphasis on the states, go some way towards separating economic development 
in the US from that of other countries. Whereas the pursuit of territoriality preoccupied all states 
in this period, American political institutions on the subnational level were much more specific 
to the US and are thus better able to explain the particularities of the American case. Lamoreaux 
and Wallis’s reading of this history, however, is too restrictive to fully capture how state policies 
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operated. Temporally, for example, they focus on economic liberalization in the 1830s and 1840s 
as a historical pivot towards a market society, dealing only cursorily with long-term historical 
development and later turning points. But state constitutions were written, revised, and re-written 
throughout the century. Why privilege one moment over others, especially the moment that 
followed state debt defaults in the aftermath of the crisis of 1837? Lamoreaux and Wallis 
likewise magnify some features of the state-level constitutional order — general incorporation, 
‘free’ banking, and fiscal limitations — at the expense of others. State constitutions in the 
nineteenth century indeed included many restrictions on their legislatures. In an effort to promote 
a more even playing field, they prohibited, at least in principle, the granting of special privileges 
to well-connected groups of investors and encouraged lawmakers to use general rather than 
special legislation. They also restricted lawmakers from investing in private corporations or 
lending the public credit to private entities.61  
Did these provisions, however, signal the end of the ‘manipulation of the economy for 
political purposes’? It seems more plausible instead to see in these clauses one instance of a 
continuous process of reshuffling the political terrain within which economic policy making was 
embedded. This was clear in state constitutional clauses declaring railroads to be ‘common 
carriers’ and thus subject to government regulation, in continued (in fact, growing) government 
subsidies to infrastructure projects, in court decisions establishing many types of corporations as 
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‘public utilities’, as well as in hundreds if not thousands of states statutes affecting every aspect 
of economic life.62 ‘The market’ never shed its deeply political nature.63 
Finally, William Novak, James Sparrow and Stephen Sawyer have proposed a pragmatic 
idea of the American state. Too familiar with the ‘maddening plurality’ of public institutions in 
the US, they reject a view of the American state as an all-powerful monolith. They usefully 
caution against a normative notion of the state that resembles ‘something of a Prussian “tank”: 
unstoppable, impenetrable, autonomous, mechanically bureaucratized, and manned by a 
regimented officialdom driving it down undeviating tracks’. They instead propose a more 
realistic and supple ‘infrastructural’ state — diffuse, decentralized, always incipient, and yet 
remarkably effective.64 
Without reproducing normative ideas about state bureaucracy, Novak, Sparrow and 
Sawyer make room for a more robust conception of public power in American history. They 
uncover a rich and dense history of government action during the crucial decades of American 
industrialization. They highlight in particular the effects of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Munn v. Illinois — a ruling that validated the authority of state governments to regulate private 
                                                          
62 William J. Novak, ‘Law and the Social Control of American Capitalism’, Emory Law Journal, lx (2010), 377; 
William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill, NC, 
1996); Noam Maggor, ‘To “Coddle and Caress These Great Capitalists”: Eastern Money and the Politics of Market 
Integration in the American West’, American Historical Review, cxxi (2016). 
63 In this critique, we follow the constitutional approach in legal history. See, for example, Desan, Making Money. 
See also, naturally, Polanyi, Great Transformation. 
64 James T. Sparrow, William J. Novak and Stephen W. Sawyer (eds.), Boundaries of the State in US History 
(Chicago, 2015). For another account that emphasizes the state’s infrastructural power, see Richard R. John, 
Network Nation: Inventing American Telecommunications (Boston, Mass., 2010). 
34 
 
industries that affected the public interest — in Novak’s terms, as ‘the very superhighway down 
which reformers drove a truckload of far-reaching experiments in the state regulation of new 
economic activity’.65 Novak and his co-authors nevertheless steer clear of the full implications of 
their own conceptual breakthrough. Their very formulation confines state actors to their 
traditional role as ‘reformers’ — that is as reactive to what is otherwise assumed to be 
autonomous ‘economic’ change, driven by private interests. Such a perspective takes for granted 
an implicit distinction between political and economic action, between private and public. It 
denies political actors full participation in shaping and re-shaping the economic order, rather than 
merely remedying its worst tendencies after the fact. This conception also tends to underplay the 
broad range of political visions that contributed to this state project. 
IV 
THE AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
But let us return to our starting question: how did the United States manage to break from the 
position it inhabited in the global division of labour of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries? That is, how did this nation not only accelerate growth, but also effect a profound 
structural transformation of the economy, register not only quantitative increases, but qualitative 
economic change? A framework that persuasively engages with this shift has to go beyond 
models that associate development, alternately, with a territorial consolidation (Maier), 
competitive markets (Lamoreaux and Wallis), or a well-regulated corporate economy (Novak, 
Sparrow and Sawyer). It ought to grant political institutions an even more pervasive role than 
conquering and administering territory, liberalizing economic life, and overseeing private firms. 
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The only framework that has extensively dealt with these types of structural shifts in global 
economic history emerges from the literature on ‘developmental states’. This heterodox literature 
has drawn its insights from the experience of East Asian ‘catch-up’ developers such as Korea, 
Japan, Taiwan, and, most recently, China.66 Just like the United States a century earlier, these 
nations have managed to pull off something extraordinarily difficult and rare: they radically 
altered their positions in the global division of labour by way of sustained industrial and 
technological development. Is there anything to be learnt from this literature that may apply to 
the US? 
At first glance, the core features identified by this literature seem hopelessly at odds with 
conventional understandings of the US since the nineteenth century that cast it as the 
quintessential market society.67 East Asian nations developed in direct violation of stylized 
notions of Anglo-Saxon market dispensations. They were (often authoritarian) states with strong 
bureaucracies pursuing purposive industrial policies. They defied ‘Washington Consensus’-style 
liberalization and instead protected and subsidized domestic firms, built up ‘national champions’, 
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and strategically controlled the inflow and outflow of foreign capital. Their governing ideologies 
arose from the predicament of the late developer. 
Nevertheless, the ‘developmental state’ literature can deliver a strong tonic to how we 
think about development more broadly, including in the American case. That is because the 
generalizable kernel of this literature does not reside in its empirical descriptions, but in its 
analytical insights. The most instructive lesson of the literature on ‘developmental states’ is the 
deconstruction of received dichotomies between state policy and market development.68 
Successful developmental states did not create spaces for competitive markets to operate freely, 
as neoclassical models, or indeed the prescriptions of Northian institutionalism, would expect 
them to. Instead, they harnessed, managed and manipulated markets. Rather than receding from 
the flows of supply and demand, developmental state institutions nested themselves in them and 
channelled them by tinkering with price incentives.69 They cajoled, nudged and pushed private 
interests in economically desired directions by tying ‘carrots’ — subsidies, protection and 
incentives – to the ‘discipline’ of demands such as moving investment towards industrial 
development and technological upgrading, which capitalists, despite their much inflated 
reputation as ‘risk-takers’, did only reluctantly.70 Successful development, understood as 
engendering not only ‘growth’ but structural economic transformation, required not institutions 
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that ‘protect’ markets, and ‘encase’71 or ‘preserve’72 them, but rather, development arose from 
institutions that managed, manipulated and channelled the generative power of markets. 
The second important lesson of this literature is about the politics of development. 
Though developmental states were ‘strong’, they were not aloof, monolithic behemoths but 
rather regimes with deep support in development-oriented social coalitions.73 Within an 
overarching ideological and social commitment to development, there was ongoing contestation 
between bureaucrats and industrialists over resource trade-offs, or over strategy, direction and 
the speed of economic transformation. Developmental policies involved state institutions and 
private actors in tense and ongoing confrontations and re-alignments. Nowhere did 
developmental states arise fully fledged — instead, they transpired from friction-ridden 
processes of trial and error, of overcoming political antagonisms and creating new institutional 
compromises.74 From this literature emerges an image that matches neither the Hayekian 
caricature of an all-powerful and impervious state of planner-bureaucrats nor the Smithian 
metaphysics of a beehive of self-interested economic actors magically creating socially superior 
outcomes. Development, this literature suggests, arose from the politics of institutional 
wrangling. 
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Both of these key insights — the emphasis on market-managing institutions and on 
ongoing political contestation over their precise setup — offer rich potential for an analysis of 
development in the US. In contrast to Weberian narratives, which insinuate the inexorable 
fashion of capitalist development and remove it from the realm of political conflict, the insights 
of the ‘developmental state’ literature puts politics and contestation squarely at the centre. Where 
Northian institutionalism is interested in political contestation up to an inflection point that gives 
birth to the ‘highest’ form of institutions — ‘open access’ systems, and the state as parsimonious 
arbiter of functioning markets — the ‘developmental state’ literature insists on ongoing conflict 
and the immersion of institutions in creating, shaping and harnessing markets. The US in the late 
nineteenth century harboured nothing resembling the powerful East Asian state bureaucracies 
that supervised and orchestrated development. The American state, we contend, nevertheless 
gained the ‘institutional capacity’ to effect and sustain structural economic change. It gained, that 
is, the capacities of a developmental state.75 
Where might we begin to discern the sources of this institutional capacity? Where did the 
American state gain the most traction vis-à-vis private actors? Here, we point to the state’s 
highly decentralized and devolved structure. Contra the territorialists’ emphasis on the federal 
government’s role in integrating a coherent national market, American institutions in fact 
engendered remarkable regulatory unevenness and variability. This was not simply a feature of 
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‘federalism’ as such, but the product of historically specific political arrangements. As Gary 
Gerstle has recently argued, federal authorities and state governments in the US did not merely 
differ in terms of geographical scale. The two levels of government deployed fundamentally 
different — almost contradictory — modes of power. Whereas the liberal Constitution strictly 
constrained federal authority, state governments were endowed with broad ‘police power’. They 
enjoyed a much more capacious mandate to proactively shape economic life, a mandate that 
showed no sign of eroding at the end of the nineteenth century. Collectivist and majoritarian, 
rather than liberal, state governments also allowed greater space for contentious politics to set 
priorities, with fewer layers of mediation between electoral outcomes and the formation of 
policy.76 
The majoritarian political drive behind state activism during the critical decades of 
American industrialization came most forcefully (but of course not exclusively) from rural 
constituencies, mostly located in the country’s periphery and semi-periphery. As Elizabeth 
Sanders and Monica Prasad have pointed out, farmers in this period mobilized to advance an 
aggressive regulatory agenda. They sought broad access to credit, leverage against railroad 
corporations, and protection from the competitive advantages of monopolies, even at the cost of 
higher prices for the goods they acquired and consumed.77 They enacted not liberal non-
interventionism but an intensely proactive agenda, including progressive taxation, robust anti-
trust policies, bankruptcy protections, banking reform, and corporate regulation (of railroads 
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freight rates in particular). These measures were launched in different iterations and 
configurations by state-level legislation before migrating — only partially and with much 
difficulty — to the federal level in the twentieth century. The net result was not a level playing 
field shaped by liberal policy but a dense patchwork of overlapping, unevenly regulated, and 
highly politicized markets. This ‘productive incoherence’ (Hirschman) — disconnected, 
experimental, even erratic procedures that were forged politically over time — generated a long 
catalogue of incentives and constraints.78 Cumulatively, we surmise, these policies obstructed the 
drive towards economic specialization, channelled and disciplined the flows of capital, and 
nurtured a robust, diverse and technologically sophisticated manufacturing base. 
The economic effects of this ‘productive incoherence’ could most readily be observed in 
the American Midwest. Here, as the literature on the developmental state would predict, the 
institutional capacity to exert public sway over market forces — by regulating railroad freight 
charges, combating monopolies and channelling the flow of credit — yielded impressive 
developmental effects. This frontier region departed from the prevailing patterns in other world 
peripheries, becoming not simply the site for the extraction and cultivation of primary 
commodities but also a heavily urbanized industrial market for those commodities. Michigan, to 
take one important state among many, grew as a resource-rich periphery over the second half of 
the nineteenth century. It absorbed huge infusions of out-of-state capital to build the necessary 
infrastructure for the removal of large amounts of lumber, iron and copper. Michigan was no 
different in this respect from Montana, Wisconsin or Nevada, but, more importantly, no different 
than Chile, Australia and South Africa. What set apart Michigan’s economic profile by the end 
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of the century was the state’s broad and diverse manufacturing base, which other peripheries 
struggled to nurture. In 1900, Detroit, Michigan, had a broad-based industrial foundation atypical 
for peripheral settlements, including nearly three thousand different manufacturing 
establishments of medium size in more than a hundred different industrial categories. But to 
further magnify this point, Detroit, the largest city in the state, had only half of the wage earners 
within the overall manufacturing economy of Michigan. It accounted for only half of Michigan’s 
‘value added’. The state had at least a dozen other lesser known cities and towns (Lansing, 
Muskegon, Saginaw, Grand Rapids and so on), each with its own manufacturing base, ranging 
from ploughs, wagons, and stoves to foundry machine shops, forks and hoes, furniture, and 
chemical works.79  
Michigan’s dispersed urban-industrial pattern was representative of the Midwest as a 
whole. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Midwest fostered home-grown manufacturing in a 
variety of sectors, beyond the processing of agricultural commodities.80 This pattern accelerated 
after the Civil War, despite rapid improvements in transportation that drastically lowered the 
costs of interregional commerce. Midwestern industries like apparel, furniture, printing and 
publishing, building materials and fabricated metals that sold products in local and regional 
markets flourished and grew, despite competition from mass producers in the East that had 
access to national markets and thus, all else being equal, should have enjoyed a competitive 
advantage. But all things were not equal — state policies tipped the scale in favour of local 
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producers — and so these regional industries continued to grow and employ large numbers of 
industrial workers, by some measures the majority of workers.81 
The same policies also limited the gravitational pull of the region’s largest cities. Despite 
their prodigious growth, the major metropolises of the Midwest operated as part of a broader 
territorial production complex that included a dense network of small- and medium-sized cities. 
Chicago’s meatpackers famously dominated the meatpacking industry but never monopolized it. 
Its meatpackers worked alongside St. Louis, Omaha, Kansas City, St. Joseph and Sioux City, not 
to mention smaller centres like Cedar Rapids, Waterloo, Ottumwa and Indianapolis. McCormick 
and Co., also of Chicago, became the most well-known manufacturer of agricultural machinery, 
but it competed in a diversified industry with producers from Racine, Springfield, Peoria, 
Decatur, Rockford and South Bend. Overall, about half the industrial workforce of the Midwest, 
in a very wide range of manufacturing sectors, was employed in smaller cities. Meanwhile, 
workers in the top eight industrial cities (an unusually dense urban network) — Chicago, 
Cincinnati, St. Louis, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Detroit, Louisville and Indianapolis — represented 
a steady, and perhaps even declining, percentage of the overall Midwestern industrial labour 
force. The expansion of this multi-layered urban-industrial geography — at odds with the trend 
towards the growing dominance of single large metropolises in other countries, especially 
elsewhere in the Americas — continued into the twentieth century.82  
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What was most remarkable about the economic geography of the region was not the 
differentiated sizes of its production units or their decentralized locations.83 The regional pattern 
we observe did not simply enhance, diversify or spatially disperse the familiar arc of American 
capitalism. It, rather, cut hard against the dominant global trends of the late nineteenth century. 
Instead of regional specialization, in the Midwest industry and agriculture intermingled. Instead 
of an exclusive focus on resource extraction and commercial farming for national and global 
markets, the Midwestern economic geography ensured that a significant share of accumulation 
redounded regionally. Instead of corporate behemoths sponsored by metropolitan finance, the 
region harboured a plethora of mid-sized shops in a wide array of sectors. If the dominant sectors 
of the age — railroads, steel, coal, resource extraction and food processing — followed the logic 
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of the Great Specialization, the political economy of the Midwest pursued a competing logic of 
regional development, complementarity and economic diversification. 
Not by coincidence, from this institutional and economic landscape arose the industry 
that encapsulated the ‘second great divergence’ like no other — the automobile industry.84 It is 
rarely appreciated that automotive mass production was a sharp departure from the extractive 
focus of corporate-led growth during the late nineteenth century. The automobile emerged from 
the workshops of the Midwest’s skilled mechanics, who nurtured a particular vision of 
development, one that advocated growing regional independence from the circuits of Eastern 
capital and championed a political economy based on popular participation in both production 
and consumption. Indeed, automotive mass production grew, not from corporate headquarters, 
but from an eclectic industrial landscape of machine shops deeply embedded in the regional 
political economy. The product, the affordable automobile, shot across the grain of the 
specialization economy: neither good for large-scale extraction nor for long-haul transport, the 
car instead supported short farm-to-market commutes. The automobile’s success took financial 
elites by surprise, and they attempted to thwart the industry by cornering the patent rights over 
the gasoline-powered motor car. That scheme foundered upon a legal ruling that rejected a 
narrow conception of intellectual property rights in favour of the open-source stance towards 
technological innovation that animated the industry’s mechanics.85 It was not before the Great 
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Depression that corporate capitalism managed to fully assimilate automotive mass production, in 
the process transforming both it and itself.86  
V 
CONCLUSION 
This Viewpoint began with a puzzle: how come one of the most momentous shifts of global 
economic history, American’s second great divergence, has been flying under the radar of 
historical scrutiny, or at least has not garnered the scholarly attention among historians 
commensurate to its significance? We traced the reasons back to pervasive patterns of thinking 
about American development as somehow natural and self-evident, as though situated in a 
preter-political realm. Transnational economic histories have continued to evade the question. 
Americanist historiography has not shaken free of modernization templates that, whether 
Whiggish or not, evacuate a substantive sense of contingency and political contestation from 
their purview. The literature about the American state, by contrast, offers a promising point of 
departure. The literature on East Asian developmental states provides a salubrious distancing 
effect that validates this state-centred approach. It calls for greater attention to markets as 
thoroughly political institutions, as well as to political contestation over the institutional design 
of markets. America’s ‘sprawling disarray’ (Novak) of subnational political arrangements, it 
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leads us to believe, had developmental effects that collectively propelled the economic 
transformation of the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
We might conclude by taking a step back and inserting these insights into a genealogy of 
American development dispensations, from Alexander Hamilton’s mercantilism via Henry 
Clay’s ‘American system’, to the late-nineteenth-century developmental state identified here, 
usurped slowly and incompletely by federal institutions in the early twentieth century. This 
genealogy also shines fresh light on the federal aspirations of the New Deal and the warfare state 
of the 1940s, which harnessed big business in unprecedented ways to national goals and more 
closely begins to resemble the ideal-type of the developmental state spelt out at the example of 
East Asia.87 From there it was but a short step to the defence-related technological upgrading 
engendered by the post-war military-industrial complex, and the modern, post-1980 ‘networked’ 
American developmental state whose pervasive mechanisms remained solidly ‘hidden’ behind 
the deafening noise of free-market incantations.88 Market politics and developmental institutions, 
in this view, have been the rule, rather than the exception, with far-reaching implications. As we 
approach the challenges of the twenty-first century — ‘Green New Deal’, climate change, 
sustainable growth — delivering a better understanding of the politics and the institutions of 
large-scale, qualitative, economic transformation is not the least of public services that historians 
might provide. 
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